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Abstract 
 
Following 10 years in operation, the European Monetary Union (EMU) has 
been shaken by the global financial crisis and some peripheral states have 
experienced significant economic shock.  The pitfalls of currency unions have 
been well documented in the literature of International Political Economy 
(IPE), so the situation that these states find themselves in cannot come as a 
surprise to any member country.   Without highly synchronised economies, 
some states will suffer significantly in the event of an exogenous shock.  This 
begs the question why a country would make an “irrational” choice to join the 
monetary union to begin with.  The predominant IPE theories on how the EMU 
was formed are explained using rational choice with material interests as the 
focus for interstate bargaining.  By arguing that they really have no choice to 
begin with, rational choice theory renders small states impotent.  Unsatisfied 
with this reductionist answer, this body of work explores the participation of 
one of the states currently in trouble by introducing a constructivist theory of 
economic identity politics.  Exploring the historical record of Ireland in the 
period of 1978 and 1992, this work reveals that Ireland in fact had choices, 
and the “irrational” choices it made were significantly influenced by Irish 
identity politics.  However Ireland’s “irrational’ motivation can only be 
understood by including economic identity politics into the analysis.  It will 
reveal that the supranational institutions of the European Union can serve as 
economic instruments to further nationalist goals.  In the process the 
institution can become embedded in the nation such a country like Ireland is 
now a hybrid - highly European monetarily while it still remains distinctively 
Irish.  As small states now make up the majority of the European Union this 
thesis adds to our understanding of small state participation in its most 
ambitious institution thus far.  
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 1 
Introduction 
The economic crisis sweeping across four member states of the 
Eurozone1 has earned them the inglorious acronym “PIGS”.  Portugal, Ireland, 
Greece and Spain have found themselves in deep financial trouble following 
the fallout of the global economic crisis.  Anti-Euro proponents have been 
quick to say ‘I told you so” and Britain has been hailed as the poster child for 
sensible monetary policy, by retaining control over its monetary sovereignty 
allowing it to devalue its currency to accommodate the financial shock.2  
Meanwhile the “PIGS” may face years of economic contraction simply to 
restore their finances within European Monetary Union (EMU) guidelines.   
The pitfalls of currency unions have been well documented in the 
literature of International Political Economy (IPE) so the situation that the 
“PIGS” find themselves in cannot come as a surprise to any member country.   
In order to meet the goals of the EMU all participating countries had to 
surrender their sovereign right to independent monetary policy in return for a 
supranational currency union.  However according to economic theory there 
has to be a high level of synchronicity between the economies of the union, 
otherwise an exogenous shock can force some member states into deep 
recession.  This is precisely what has happened in Europe, the monetary 
policy for the union at large does not meet the requirement of the most badly 
affected economies.  The first question that springs to mind is why an 
economically rational entity would ever join such a union to begin with.  To 
answer this question the thesis has focused on Ireland because it represented 
the extreme outlier in Europe; it was the least synchronised economy within 
the European Community on formation of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) in 1979; and again in 1992 when it ratified the Maastricht treaty for 
European Union.  Therefore it stood to suffer the worst impact in the event of 
an exogenous economic shock.  The economic argument strongly supported 
a decision for Ireland to remain outside the EMS and EMU yet it proved to be 
an enthusiastic supporter of monetary union in contradiction to rational 
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expectations.  Through a detailed analysis of the actual political record this 
thesis will reveal that Ireland did not enter this arrangement temerariously, in 
fact its Government was fully aware of the economic choices it made.  In turn 
it will reveal that identity politics was the driving force for Ireland’s participation 
in the institutions of European Union.   
To close the gap between expected and actual behaviour, this thesis 
underwent a detailed exploration of the political debates in the Irish Dáil3 and 
the popular press in both 1978 and again in 1992.  The purpose of this was to 
reconcile the seemingly irrational decisions made on both occasions with the 
public and political discourse.  Was Ireland simply naïve on the economic 
ramification of monetary union?  Was rational choice theory correct and 
Ireland had no choice but to join, or were other factors at play? 
The thesis begins by reviewing the existing body of IPE literature on 
the formation of the EMS and EMU.  The literature review highlights that the 
predominant focus of IPE literature on European institutional formation is 
based on rational choice theory, with monetary sovereignty as a central 
foundation for interstate bargaining.  This body of work is largely applied to 
the big states of the European Union including Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom (UK).  In the process small, weaker states are either ignored 
completely or pooled together under some generalisation such as ‘the South”.   
The literature review highlights the limited scope of the 
Intergovernmentalist framework when applied to small states as it is too 
reductionist and as such renders a very limited view of small state motivation.  
With its focus on power and bargaining, small states are quickly rendered 
impotent.  Part of the problem lies in the fact that the study of IPE has tended 
to ignore how national preferences are formed and once made how they 
influence economic policy - preferences are simply “given”.  This thesis 
presents an alternative constructivist framework to provide a richer 
understanding of small state engagement, introducing identity politics as the 
driving force behind international economic policy.  This framework builds on 
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 Dáil is the official name for the Irish parliament.   
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the constructivist work of theorists such as Eric Helleiner, Andreas Pickel and 
Rawi Abdelal and has been labelled “economic identity politics”. 4   
The thesis explores the Irish record to understand how national identity 
directed economic policy.  A detailed examination of the official record from 
the Dáil debates of 1978 and 1992 will reveal how Ireland’s decision to join 
the EMS and EMU was mainly driven by economic identity politics.  Ireland 
was fully aware of the potential economic hardship that could result from its 
decisions yet it went ahead with an economically “irrational” decision in pursuit 
of its nationalist goals.  By encompassing identity, and not just interest, this 
thesis will show how small states leverage supranational institutions to create 
their own economic identity.  Further it will reveal that the positive or negative 
identification of these small states can affect the integrity of the institution 
itself, put simply, small states have power too. 
 Finally this thesis will show that the focus on rational choice theory in 
analysing political economies has proven insufficient to explain smaller state 
motivation for joining supranational institutions.  While it may have provided a 
“big-bang” theory on large state motivation,  rational choice theory provides 
little insight into how the institution will fare as more and more small states join 
the institution.  By including economic identity politics into the framework, our 
understanding of how the European Monetary Union may fare in the future will 
be significantly improved.   
 
                                                
4
 Helleiner, Pickel and Abdelal label their constructivist framework “economic nationalism”, however 
this term is confusing as it conjures up Robert Gilpin’s neo-realist account of economic nationalism.  
Therefore the author has coined the framework “economic identity politics” to avoid any confusion.   
 4 
The Political Economy of Monetary Union 
The following section reviews the theory of monetary unions from their 
economic foundations to the politics of monetary cooperation.  It begins by 
reviewing Europe’s chequered history of currency unions to demonstrate that 
the drive for the EMU should not be considered sui generis, in fact monetary 
unions had been pursued for millennia.  The section then reviews the two 
major competing debates around the formation of the EMS and the EMU.  
The literature review will reveal that rational choice theory takes a narrow view 
of institution formation and fails to provide a convincing explanation for small 
state participation in Europe’s monetary institutions. 
The Appeal of Currency Unions 
Far from being a recent innovation, currency unions have predated the 
modern nation state for millennia.  The Roman Empire oversaw one of the 
earliest European currency unions and created a uniform currency that 
persisted as long as the Empire did.  Early European economists such as 
John Stuart Mills favoured a world currency and attributed the nationalistic 
nature of currencies to the “vestiges of barbarism” in what were still to be “fully 
civilized” nations. 5  While the likelihood of a single world currency is unlikely 
any time soon, a regional currency union serves to deliver the benefits of a 
currency union on a more manageable scale.   
Past history has shown that while currency unions remove uncertainty 
and volatility in trade relations, they are fragile systems subject to failure 
under political pressure.  As trade between European countries increased 
dramatically during the 19th century a common currency that would make 
valuation and exchange more seamless became highly desirous.  However 
while a common European currency removed the uncertainties of trade, the 
19th century attempts at a currency union were politically motivated.  The Latin 
Monetary Union established in 1865 between France, Belgium and 
Switzerland, favoured the imperialist political ambitions of France. Meanwhile 
the Scandinavian Monetary System between Sweden, Denmark and Norway 
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 Robert A. Mundell, "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas," The American Economic Review 51, 
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served to strengthen the political solidarity between these northern states. 6  
The currency unions only proved as strong as the degree of political 
commitment, cooperation and trust that sovereign states bestowed on each 
other and interstate trade alone was not sufficient to maintain the union.  
Ultimately the onset of the First World War undermined the functioning of both 
currency unions leading to their collapse. 7  
On a global scale, monetary unions did not fare any better.  By the turn 
of the 20th century a system backed by gold had emerged as the first truly 
international monetary system.  It provided a framework for stability that 
enabled international trade to flourish, and it protected the money supply from 
political meddling within sovereign countries, as all domestic currency had to 
be backed by gold reserves.8  However in spite of its attraction, the Gold 
Standard did not fare any better than the European specific arrangements as 
governments were forced to trade off currency goals against domestic political 
priorities.9  Following World War II a new international monetary arrangement 
based on a United States (US) dollar peg was created under the supervision 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  The new Bretton Woods system 
included greater domestic flexibility allowing governments some limited 
correction for monetary disequilibrium.   But again it faced a similar demise to 
all prior currency unions due to severe devaluation in the US dollar caused by 
the political demands to fund a costly war in Vietnam.  On August 15th 1971, 
President Nixon formally broke the US commitment to maintain convertibility 
of the US dollar at a peg of $35 to an ounce of gold, effectively ending the 
Bretton Woods system for good.10   
With the demise of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s, Europe created a 
regional currency union generally based on the rules of Bretton Woods, but 
this time built around a narrow band of fluctuation of 2.25%.  The new system 
called “the Snake” limited exchange rate fluctuations between European 
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 Ibid. p. 33 
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 B Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton Univ 
Pr, 2008). p. 29 
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 Public announcement by Nixon on US Television:-  
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countries, however it remained pegged to the US dollar, a further devaluation 
of the US dollar in 1973 dealt a fatal blow to this currency union.  The 
consequent appreciation of the Deutschmark made it unsustainable for many 
of the Snake currencies to maintain parity within the system and they 
abandoned the union.  A scaled down monetary union based on the 
Deutschmark continued between the Northern European countries including 
Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Denmark until 1978.  In 
the demise of the international arrangements the Deutschemark emerged as 
Europe’s regional anti-inflationary currency peg of choice.11   
The European experience in monetary unions demonstrated a number 
of important factors that became the foundation of the EMU: firstly, a stable 
currency union had facilitated ease of trading, particularly for export focused 
economies like Germany; secondly, political involvement in currency unions 
led to their demise; thirdly when the monetary arrangement lacked a single 
monetary authority there was nothing preventing a country from abandoning 
the exchange rate mechanism leading to its inevitable demise.  Intent on 
creating its own zone of economic and monetary stability separate from the 
US dollar, the European Economic Community (EEC) undertook a study of 
monetary options to satisfy the Community needs.  Published in 1970, the 
Werner report12 outlined the requirements for a stable monetary union.  It 
recommended a system composed of an independent supranational central 
bank supported by a coordinated fiscal union among member states.   As 
such, the EMU represented the first currency union that truly blurred the line 
between domestic and international control.  The EMU, if it ever were to 
materialize, would require a major shift in sovereign authority from national 
entities to an apolitical supranational institution independent of political 
meddling or national sovereign governments. 
Flandreau and Maurel contend that the prior examples of European 
and global currency unions were mislabelled as they represented regimes 
based on adherence to some underlying standard of cooperation rather than a 
true currency union that the Eurozone represents.  Lacking a common central 
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of Pierre Werner. 
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bank or federal monetary authority, there was nothing preventing a country 
from printing and circulating money within its own sovereign boundaries.  
Such an act would ultimately lead to exchange depreciation between the 
rogue country and the other currency union members resulting in de-facto 
exclusion from the union.13 They note that to compare the Euro area to prior 
monetary regimes is inappropriate. The EMU represented the first democratic, 
multinational currency union that involved ceding monetary authority to a 
supranational organization while retaining political sovereignty.  As such the 
Euro represented a major shift in sovereign authority from national entities to 
a supranational institution not answerable to any individual sovereign body. 
Therefore the surrender of monetary sovereignty has become a major focus 
of the political discourse around the EMS and EMU.  This thesis will show 
how the focus on sovereignty and interstate bargaining has limited our 
understanding of why states participate (or not) in supranational 
arrangements.  In particular this limited view, particularly in the field of IPE, 
does little to further our understanding of small state participation.  This next 
section reviews the two leading theories that have dominated the discourse of 
IPE as an explanation for the evolution of Europe’s monetary institutions. 
The Politics of European Monetary Union 
The theoretical debates on the evolution of the European Monetary 
Union have centred around two competing explanatory frameworks, namely 
Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism.  At the most general level, 
Neofunctionalists argue that European institutions frame policy choices while 
Intergovernmentalists argue that nation states and national preferences 
dominate European politics.  To a degree the arguments are speaking over 
each other as one emphasises cause while the other addresses effect.  Either 
way, both share a common underlying assumption that political actors act 
according to a rational decision making process.   
The following section reviews these competing theoretical accounts of 
European monetary integration and critiques them from the perspective of 
explaining a state’s participation firstly in the EMS and later the EMU.  The 
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fundamental claim of this section is that the body of explanatory literature on 
the formation of the Europe’s monetary union is biased towards large state 
power politics and does little to explain the participation of smaller peripheral 
economies of the Union.  As a generalization, the major theoretical 
explanations work well in the context of larger states, but small state 
participation either goes unaddressed or is reduced to a minor role due to the 
power asymmetry within European community.  As such the IPE literature 
produced around the formation of the EMS and the EMU predominately 
focuses on Germany, France and the UK.  Ireland, which received scant 
mention, was on occasion lumped with “the South” for convenience, or more 
usually ignored completely.  The literature review reveals that the 
Intergovernmentalist accounts of the process of European monetary 
integration is far richer in depth and breadth then the Neofunctionalist 
accounts as it provides theoretical explanations for the formation of both the 
EMS and EMU as well as small and large state participation.  Therefore 
Neofunctionalism is acknowledged briefly but the bulk of the theoretical review 
focuses on Intergovernmentalism. 
Neofunctionalism 
The Neofunctionalist debate on European Union has primarily centred on 
articulating how incremental political change occurred through a self-
sustaining process of integration.  Pioneered by Ernest B. Haas during the 
1960s this theoretical framework was used extensively to explain the ongoing 
process of integration in Europe up to the 1970s.  Neofunctionalists argue that 
the “low politics” of economic interdependence between nation states 
eventually leads to “high politics” of full political integration within Europe.  The 
process begins by first focusing on non-controversial “technical” issues that 
solve a common problem.  In time, through experience and learning the 
integration process “spills-over” into new areas that encompass “high politics” 
issues requiring supranational oversight.  At this level the supranational 
institutions develop a self-reinforcing cycle of institution-building managed by 
elites and technocratic bureaucracies.14  The theory stresses that ultimately 
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 Andrew Hurrell, "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics," Review of 
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governments are embedded in a process of integration over which they have 
little control; instead the system generates its own momentum.  The theory fell 
out of favour in the 1970s as it struggled to explain the lack of progress in the 
European Union (EU).  However it was revived by Wayne Sandholtz and John 
Zysman to explain the formation of the EU in 1992.  They argued that the elite 
alliance between the European Commission, central bank technocrats and 
business groups furthered monetary integration as an inevitable spill-over 
from economic integration of the Single European Act in 1989.  With the 
removal of all trade barriers and the elimination of all capital controls, 
monetary union was a natural spill-over effect to ensure economic stability.15   
While Neofunctionalism has added richness to the debate on why 
institutions continue to persist it has been criticized for its inability to explain 
an institution’s origins.16  As such it is unable to explain the transition from 
self-interested actors to cooperation based on collective interests.17  Secondly 
Neofunctionalism fails to explain the stop-start progress in institutional 
integration. As an example the process of monetary union took over 40 years 
from original concept.  While Sandholtz and Zysman provide a solid account 
for persistence of EMU integration, the analysis lacks account of the prior 
events leading to the EMS.  As such, Neofunctionalism failed to provide much 
insight into some of the critical initial steps to monetary formation and as such 
it proved insufficient for the scope of this thesis.   
Intergovernmentalism and Member State Cooperation 
“Europe can hold its own in world-wide competition with Japan and North 
America only if it acts as one” 
     Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor 
 
Within the European Community, intergovernmental bargaining was seen as 
“an institutionalized form of collective action among states” in response to 
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perceived external threats. 18  Through inter-state relations countries could 
develop a common set of solutions to problems that arose from increased 
regional interdependence.  Beginning in the 1970s, Europe was increasingly 
under attack from the economic power of Japan highlighting its growing 
uncompetitiveness in the world market.  In addition it found itself at the mercy 
of US dollar depreciation which drove up the value of the Deutschmark, 
disrupting intra-European trade.  Added to this pressure, all regions found 
themselves at the mercy of OPEC19 induced inflation due to oil price hikes.  It 
was widely held that individual European states had lost much of their former 
power over economic policy as global financial pressure had forced 
economies to remove tariffs and increase capital flows, or face punishment 
from the capital markets20.   States responded to the loss of power over 
macroeconomic policy by opting to compete as larger economic blocks such 
as the European Union. 21  Through regional integration, states could pool 
their sovereignty as a means of preserving their own powers against these 
external threats.  The EU provided a compromise solution for national 
governments to maintain greater control over their economies by acting as a 
regional competitive block instead of being exposed to the impacts of 
globalisation from multilateral trade and competition.  The EU was unique in 
that it went further than the other regional blocks by pooling monetary 
sovereignty in return for greater regional power.  Europeans could have 
simply integrated trade policies while maintaining flexible exchange rates, a 
system that NAFTA22 has operated under since its inception.  Yet the decision 
to pool monetary sovereignty became one of the major policy initiatives 
pursued in the process of European regional integration. 
 Intergovernmentalist theory views national governments as the 
principal agents driving European co-operation and the centrality of State 
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sovereignty is one of its defining elements.  Pioneered by Andrew Moravcsik, 
“Intergovernmentalist theory seeks to analyse the EC as the result of 
strategies pursued by rational governments acting on the basis of their 
preferences and power.”23  Based on rational choice theory, it emphasises the 
role of inter-state cooperation through bargaining.  Central to 
Intergovernmentalist theory is the preference of states for the preservation of 
sovereignty in evaluating their options for cooperation, and monetary 
sovereignty was considered an essential element of state sovereignty.  Robert 
Mundell argues that “the right to produce and control money is a clear-cut test 
of a country’s independence and sovereignty”.24  It was accepted that a 
sovereign entity maintains the prerogative to 1) determine what constitutes 
money, 2) the right to determine legal tender and 3) the right to produce 
money. 25  In this light, monetary sovereignty was seen as something that 
solidified the Westphalian concept of a nation.  Therefore relinquishing 
monetary sovereignty to a supranational arrangement would have to be 
compensated by some greater political or economic benefit that more that 
offset the domestic sacrifice.  As such, monetary sovereignty has dominated 
much of the EMU Intergovernmentalist debate in terms of what it what it 
means to relinquish monetary sovereignty to an alternative monetary 
arrangement.   
The rational argument for creating monetary unions was presented in 
terms of economic efficiency.  Hailed as “the Godfather of the Euro” Robert 
Mundell’s work on Optimal Currency Areas (OCAs) framed a significant 
amount of the debate in the lead up to the formation of the EMS and later the 
EMU.  The fundamental question that Mundell addressed was the conditions 
that made it advantageous for regions to relinquish monetary sovereignty in 
favour of a supranational currency regime.  He posited that optimal stability 
was valid only if it was based on economically homogenous units.  These 
regions shared common characteristics such as economic symmetry, a high 
degree of intra-region trade, high labour mobility and fiscal transfers from 
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economically stronger to weaker areas.  He reiterated that regions are 
economic entities with a high degree of homogeneity and the argument for 
flexible exchange rates “hinges on the closeness with which nations 
correspond to regions”26.  However regions are typically socially constructed 
areas with defined territorial boundaries, which may not necessarily map to an 
OCA. 27  Mundell was unconvinced that a currency union could ever 
materialise given the major political hurdles that would have to be overcome 
in its creation:   
 “What is the appropriate domain of a currency area?  It might 
seem at first that the question is purely academic since it 
hardly appears within the realm of political feasibility that 
national currencies would ever be abandoned in favour of any 
other arrangement.” 28 
 
Geoffery Garrett highlights how the European Community members 
shared a common goal of increasing Europe’s competitiveness in the global 
marketplace by developing an internal market as a means to create new 
forms of protectionism.  Meanwhile by sharing a common currency they were 
able to lower internal transaction costs through a single market.   However 
state preferences are based on the cost/benefit trade off between increased 
integration and loss of sovereignty.  As long as the benefit of collective action 
outweighs the cost of remaining autonomous, states will participate in the 
institutional arrangement.  The primary rational put forward for a currency 
union was to facilitate ease of trade among participants of the union and to 
guarantee greater price stability through lower inflation.   But to accomplish 
these objectives sovereign states had to relinquish a powerful weapon to 
manage a nation’s welfare in times of economic crisis – monetary 
independence.  As long as Europe represented an OCA, the rational 
economic argument held that it was in the interest of states to cooperate as 
they would all benefit from the shared currency.  But in fact the EMU was 
highly criticized by economists because it did not map to an OCA. 29  There 
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was a significant lack of synchronicity between the core “hard” currency areas 
and the peripheral economies such as Ireland. However the theory of OCA 
was still used extensively in the official documents produced by the European 
Commission to convince governments that Europe did in fact constitute one.30  
The European Commission staunchly defended monetary union on the basis 
of a rational economic argument of OCAs, arguing that “on average” the EU 
was more synchronous than not.  The accepted Intergovernmental view is 
that the EU institutional formation was largely political and economic logic was 
applied to add “after the fact” credibility to the initiative.   
Lloyd Gruber is the main proponent of an Intergovernmentalist view to 
describe the formation of the EMS.  In particular he focuses on small weak 
states as an explanatory basis for his “Winners and Losers”31 explanation for 
the formation of supranational institutions.  Gruber provides a pessimistic view 
of the regionalisation process which argues that weak peripheral states had 
no choice but to participate in the EMS driven by the “go-it-alone” power of the 
institutional beneficiaries, France and Germany.  Gruber proposes that many 
of the purported “successful” supranational organizations such as the EMS 
and NAFTA are in fact composed of “winners” and “losers”, meaning that they 
had a pareto-improving impact on a select number of countries but the 
“losers” were worse off on a relative and absolute sense.32  In particular he 
notes that the participation of losers is the result of “the absence of any better 
alternative” “despite their strong preference for the original, pre-cooperation 
status quo”.33  But given the inevitability of the institutional formation, they are 
forced into a Hobson’s choice of participation or suffering the worse 
consequences of complete exclusion.34  France, Germany and the 
Deutschmark pegged states stood to benefit from the pooled sovereignty of 
the OCA, while states like Britain, Italy and Ireland faced being relegated to 
the periphery within a “two tier” Europe. Their preference was the status quo, 
but that could never be regained as France and Germany had altered the 
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game.  Given this analysis, Gruber argued that governments join institutional 
arrangements that render them worse off as the means to avoid an even more 
deleterious outcome.  The more powerful states create a new dynamic that 
alters the regional status and smaller states are forced to join simply to stay in 
the game.  As such, regionalism does not reflect a pooling or sharing of risk 
and reward in return for loss in sovereignty, rather the winning strategy will go 
ahead irrespective of what weaker do.  The peripheral players are reduced to 
making a decision on whether to be included in the institutional arrangement 
or whether to suffer an even worse fate external to the institution.35  Gruber 
specifically mentioned Ireland as an example of one of the losers camp 
reduced to bargaining for side-payments as symbolic face savers. 36  Gruber’s 
account of institutional formation such as NAFTA and EMS leaves little room 
for small state preferences as they are relegated to mere survival.   
Intergovernmental theorists like Moravcsik and Garret primarily focus 
on the 1992 formation of the EMU, which was far more encroaching on 
sovereign power than the EMS.  According to Garrett interstate bargaining 
was central to explaining the particular path chosen by the European member 
states from the many possible economic and political alternatives that could 
have provided a coordinated regional response.37  Garret reduced the EMU 
into three broad camps; the UK and Denmark were pro-deregulation but 
vehemently against EU level re-regulation therefore their preference was to 
maintain monetary sovereignty while supporting the removal of capital 
controls;  France, Germany and Benelux countries were less supportive of 
deregulation but wished to see a greater level of harmonization of practices 
within Europe therefore the currency union appealed to their desire for 
monetary stability; finally the South, which included the poorer Southern 
European countries (and Ireland) stood to lose anyway and states simply 
bargained for what they could get in terms of structural funds.38  Moravcsik 
provides a similar view of the process of European integration with state 
support pooled around specific preferences.  Britain and Denmark preferred a 
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laissez-faire trade regime while France, Germany and the Benelux countries 
preferred a more managed economy.  The final group of Southern states 
knew they had no choice and resorted to bargaining for development 
assistance paid for by the wealthier member states.39  Ultimately both 
analyses reduce the peripheral states down to a thin explanation of interests 
with no consideration for national differences.   
Intergovernmentalism has been criticised for its focus on “grand 
bargains”.  While it provides a powerful argument for major institutional 
formations such as the European Union, it provides little insight into the 
smaller bargains that cumulatively led to bigger change within the European 
context.  In addition it reflects the neo-realist preoccupation with sovereignty 
as the essential element of state preferences, where the ultimate goal is 
relative gains while conceding as little sovereignty as possible.  It assumes 
that groups cluster around narrowly defined interests and those preferences 
remain fixed during the process of interstate bargaining.40  The bargaining 
process is limited to deals and side payments without any preference 
adjustment.  In addition, Intergovernmentalism is focused exclusively on the 
instruments of state with no differentiation between state and society; 
therefore it fails to articulate any cultural or ideational goals that could lead to 
“irrational” behaviour.41  As a case in point, the Danish plebiscite rejected the 
Maastricht treaty on the grounds of diminished monetary sovereignty – quite a 
rational position to take.  However the Danes had long ago surrendered 
functional monetary sovereignty to the Deutschmark as an active participant 
in both the “Snake” and the EMS.  At a functional level, a yes vote on 
Maastricht would have maintained status quo, not resulted in some huge loss 
of sovereignty.  Yet the plebiscite rejected monetary union on the grounds of 
maintaining sovereignty and even today it still maintains a peg to ERM II while 
rejecting full monetary integration.   
Finally while the “grand bargains” provide meaningful insight into large 
state participation, the Intergovernmentalist theory has a very limited 
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explanation for small state participation.  It fails to provide any more creative 
solution than “cap in hand” bargaining for peripheral states faced with the 
inevitable loss of power.  The assumption that they were left no option is just 
too reductionist.  Peter Katzenstein, one of the few writers who focused on 
small European states, notes that small states of Europe lacked the power to 
engage in meaningful intergovernmental economic bargaining therefore this 
level of analysis does nothing to explain their participation. According to 
Katzenstein, the study of European integration has been dominated by a 
“great-power fixation”42  which renders students of International Relations (IR) 
ignorant of small European state politics.   He argues that in a global context, 
the odds are stacked against small and dependant states but this does not 
render them helpless and without choice.  Therefore what largely goes 
unmentioned in the body of IPE is that even though small state choices are 
limited, they still have some choices.43  As the European Union expands 
eastwards, it is increasingly moving to a system of smaller states and the 
classic theoretical approach of power politics becomes less valid or 
informative.  In particular as Europe expands eastwards with many new small 
members the prominent IPE theories lose relevance in exploring and 
analysing future membership.    
Critique 
This section has reviewed the two competing IPE theories on 
European integration, Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism.  Neither of 
the rational choice theories provides meaningful insight into small state 
participation in Europe’s supranational institutions.  Both rely too heavily on 
utility maximizing actors while treating preferences exogenous to the process 
of integration.  The path to monetary integration was presented in a highly 
technocratic form that presented the logic in terms of economic fact absent 
any cultural preferences.  Both are preoccupied with large state power and 
largely ignore or minimize small state participation.   
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Both Eric Helleiner and Benjamin Cohen argue that the traditional 
concept of sovereign territorial currencies is no longer valid with the effects of 
new technological advancements in the globalization of capital.44  Nations no 
longer have the power to control money in ways that were historically possible 
therefore the focus on monetary sovereignty almost seems anachronistic.  
This became patently clear during the global economic crisis when national 
governments were left defenceless against the global capital meltdown.  
Therefore the traditional view of sovereign monetary power has been 
significantly eroded and may not be a valid unit of analysis to begin with.   
Neofunctionalist explanations for the formation of Europe’s 
supranational institutions over-generalise the process of institution building 
and it is widely criticised for not providing a satisfactory account of European 
integration.  In fact, its pioneer Earnest Haas advocated that the theory 
needed to be supplemented by a more general theory encompassing national 
preferences.45    
The Intergovernmentalist model is preoccupied with monetary 
sovereignty as an explanatory mechanism for the inter-state bargaining 
process.  However what happens when a state does not possess monetary 
sovereignty to begin with?  Ireland had never possessed functional monetary 
sovereignty during its 56 years of existence.  As a hard peg to Sterling, its 
monetary policy was imported from Britain.  Given that Ireland essentially had 
no monetary sovereignty to bargain with, one would expect that its decision 
making would be carefully framed around the most favourable economic 
decisions.  If economic rational was to prevail, Ireland would have evaluated 
the case for monetary convergence from the perspective of economic best-fit.  
As Table 1 demonstrates, at the time of formation of the EMS Ireland’s 
economy was highly uncorrelated in relation to the German economy.  Being 
pegged to the Deutschmark meant that Ireland stood to suffer significantly in 
the event of any economic shock.  Given that the 1970s had been marked by 
significant oil driven shocks, this posed a real and present threat to the Irish 
economy.  Even as late as 1992 when Ireland pursed further integration 
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towards monetary union, it still remained the worst synchronized economy 
within Europe with a correlation of only 0.35 between it and Germany.46  On 
analyzing Ireland’s export profile in 1978, almost 50% of its exports went to 
the United Kingdom alone.47  Given that Ireland was already participating in 
an OCA with Britain, it should have maintained a currency union with its 
primary trading partner not joined the EMS.  As noted by Gruber, there was 
no coercive power being ladled on the peripheral members to join the EMS, 
therefore Ireland did not stand to lose significantly. 
 





Germany - 1 
Denmark 0.77 2 
France 0.71 3 
Netherelands 0.67 4 
Belgium 0.66 5 
[Greece]b 0.59 6 
United Kingdom 0.58 7 
[Austria] 0.56 8 
[Finland] 0.53 9 
[Portugal] 0.49 10 
[Spain] 0.47 11 
Italy 0.47 12 
[Sweden] 0.29 13 
Ireland 0.16 14 
 
Source: Lloyd Gruber: Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational 
Institutions48 
a
 Correlation between annual GDP growth rates in Germany and other European Countries, 
the closer to 1.0 the higher the correlation 
b
 Countries in brackets were not members of the EU in 1979 
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In summarising, the literature review reveals that the prominent IPE 
literature covering European monetary integration provides a weak fit to 
explain Ireland’s decision to join the EMS in 1978 and to join the EMU in 
1992.  On both occasions Ireland had an alternative choice and in both cases 
Ireland proved to be an enthusiastic supporter for the creation of the 
institution, yet its actions appear contrary to its material interests.  
Intergovernmentalism provides a strong argument for institutional formation 
through the balance of interstate bargaining and sovereignty preservation.  
However while power dynamics plays a major role for large states, it proves 
too reductionist for small states with little power, relegating them into the “cap-
in-hand” bargaining camp.  Due to the centrality of sovereignty as the basis of 
bargaining, it has difficulty accommodating alternative realities.  For large 
states money was seen as an extension of state monopoly on power therefore 
it is fitting that the Intergovernmentalist approach works well for them.  
However for smaller states with no major claim on monetary sovereignty it 
requires an alternative framework to provide a more meaningful explanation 
for economic decision making that on the surface defies the rationally 
bounded world of traditional IPE scholarship.   
 20 
Economic Identity Politics as an Alternative Framework 
The following section presents an alternative framework that provides a more 
expansive role for institutions beyond the limited instrumentality outlined in the 
literature review.  The predominant theories of IPE focus on government 
decisions that are derived from their material interests in economic structures 
and nationality or culture are exogenous to the process.  As Rawi Abdelal 
notes, IPE is hostile to identity politics due to its “relativity” or “being against 
science”.  However recent scholarship has challenged the prominence of 
economic rationalism in explaining state participation in the supranational 
institutions of Europe.  Theorists such as Peter Katzenstein, Rawi Abdelal, 
Eric Hellenier and Colin Hay have provided greater insight into the field of IPE 
by encompassing identity politics to broaden the perspective on how society 
and political economy interrelate. 
In the process of providing a constructivist view some of the authors 
have confusingly reclaimed the term “economic nationalism” to further their 
case for introducing identity politics back into IPE.49  Traditionally economic 
nationalism (also termed neo-mercantilism) has been associated with Robert 
Gilpin’s seminal work on economic protectionism.50  Gilpin’s profoundly neo-
realist perspective is considered anachronistic as it is associated with the 
economic protectionist policies prominent in the interwar period through to the 
1970s.  However as George Crane notes, this narrow view of nationalism 
should be termed “statism” as it treats identity as “exogenously given, 
deductible from state interests, which in turn are determined by interstate 
systemic conditions”51  This view is echoed by Helleiner and Abdelal who 
argue that Gilpin’s economic nationalism is merely a “masterly restatement of 
realist political economy” whereas nationalism is “an expression of a 
constructed societal identity”.52  Nationality combines the indeterminacy of 
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race, ethnicity, language, religion, shared historical experience, political 
culture and economic reality.  Even more problematic, it is not necessarily 
territorially bounded and it is subject to change and contestation.53   
However the constructivist use of the term “economic nationalism” to explain a 
vastly different concept has injected confusion into the field of IR.  To avoid 
promulgating any further confusion, this thesis will use the term “economic 
identity politics” as a clarifying term for the reader who associates economic 
nationalism with traditional neo-realist literature.  Economic identity politics 
focuses on economic policy that emanates from a shared national identity and 
is guided by national purpose and direction.   
By making identity the locus of enquiry it helps explain how foreign 
economic policies can help advance nationalist goals.  Economic identity 
politics can include the political legitimization of new state economies, the 
development of a national economic identity or the distancing from prior 
economic dependency.  Economic identity politics describes how 
governments use national or foreign economic policies in order to enhance 
some particular definition of collective identity.  It explains how societies are 
willing to endure national economic sacrifice for a higher national goal that 
shapes the vision of the future.  Economic identity politics stresses the longer 
term vision for society and its government such that current sacrifice is framed 
in terms of future rewards. Finally it directs economic policy away from the 
nations “other” towards a new cultural space.54  For example, Rawi Abdelal 
shows how Estonia oriented its foreign economic policies around the West 
and away from Russia, (the “other”) to legitimize its European identity.  It 
rejected close economic ties with Russia and was willing to endure the 
economic cost of establishing its autonomy.  It even rejected its Ruble link and 
pegged to the Deutschmark in 1992, linking its currency toward a new cultural 
space – Europe. 55   
Using this framework, economic identity politics provides a much richer 
picture of international economic policy providing explanatory power for 
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seemingly irrational economic decisions.  It can reconcile the participation in 
neoliberal supranational institutions with purely national identity goals.  As 
such economic identity politics can explain actions that are seemingly 
contradictory or dichotomous.  The very act of pursuing a nationalist goal can 
lead to greater participation in a supranational entity such as monetary union.   
Economic Identity and Monetary Sovereignty 
In the way that monetary sovereignty is overemphasised as an instrument of 
power politics, the theoretical literature on the EMU ignores the indeterminate 
aspects of monetary sovereignty as a unifying national symbol.  Cohen 
argues that while the production of money may not be an essential attribute of 
the state it has been monopolized by Governments as a means to further 
national identity.  Beginning in the 19th century, as geographically defined 
states acquired monopoly power over currencies, one of the benefits 
bestowed on governments was the political symbolism that accompanied 
monetary unification.56  Kaelberer notes how money began to represent a 
collective identity which governments leveraged to enhance their nationalist 
goals to generate greater social cohesion.  Money became an essential 
element in the “imagined community”57 of the sovereign state.  The imagery 
on notes and coins provided governments with a means to express their 
vision of the state.58  Helleiner notes how France emblazoned its notes with 
liberty, equality and fraternity, while Kaelberer shows how post World War II 
German notes turned to scientists and artists rather than promoting political 
heroes.59  Words like “strong” and “weak” are used to describe a currency and 
there is a sense of national pride in being associated with “strong” even if its 
economic impact is deleterious.  While the nuances of monetary sovereignty 
may be beyond the average citizen, the physicality of money and what it can 
buy is tangible for everyone.  While economic rationality might favour 
combining currencies, national desires to maintain monetary sovereignty can 
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be highly influenced by the perceived loss of identity in transitioning to the 
sterile functionality of the Euro.   
 While the literature on IPE overemphasises the centrality of monetary 
sovereignty in foreign economic policy, it ignores the centrality of money in the 
formation and reinforcement of national identity.  As noted by René Lévesque, 
the leader of the Quebec Nationalist movement, “[it] is national image which 
makes the franc the franc and the lire, the lire” not monetary sovereignty.60  
To return to an example mentioned previously, the Danes rejected the 
Maastricht treaty on the grounds of economic identity, even though their 
currency had been functionally pegged to the German mark prior to 1992 and 
had been associated with some form of monetary union for most of its prior 
existence.  Similarly the British resistance to the Euro is significantly 
influenced by public’s refusal to give up the pound which is considered a 
major symbol of being British.  Yet economic rationalism has no means to 
capture this essential piece of monetary sovereignty, as identity is exogenous 
and sovereignty is only reflected in terms of state power.    
 It is important to note that the Euro had existed in all but the physical 
coinage for three years before it gained a public face.  As an electronic 
currency from 1999 to 2001 it served as the main currency for all economic 
transactions.  As Kaelberer notes, “the Euro was already there when it 
arrived”.61  From an economic perspective there was no change when the 
physical currency came into being in 2002, yet the transition to the physical 
currency created a significant identity gap within many of the individual 
countries that still exists today.62   
In summary, this section has outlined an alternative framework for 
reviewing the decision making process to participate in monetary union by 
framing it in terms of economic identity politics.  In doing so it has allowed a 
much richer interpretation for individual nation engagement (or not) with 
supranational organizations.  In addition, it has provided a better 
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understanding of monetary sovereignty articulating how it can never be 
treated as entirely functionalist as its very roots and legitimacy are based on 
collective national identity.  It has also shown how economic identity 
significantly impacts how countries view matters of economic sovereignty.  
Monetary identity can exist in the effective absence of functional economic 
monetary sovereignty; therefore it is essential to consider identity when 
reviewing any arrangement that involves ceding monetary power to a 
supranational institution.  Using a framework that encompasses economic 
identity politics, the following section will help unravel Ireland’s puzzling and 
economically “irrational” participation in both the EMS and EMU.   
 25 
Experimental Union 
Ireland the Outlier 
Throughout its history in the European Union, Ireland has remained an 
enigma for IPE theorists. 63   As recent as 2008, Hay et al. noted that it 
inhabits a unique position being an outlier both physically and economically. 
Geographically remote and unattached to mainland Europe, it is the only 
liberal “Anglo-American” style market in the Eurozone and is the most heavily 
dependent on trade and investment from economies external to the union. 
Superficially it has less to gain from Euro membership than any other 
economy within the Eurozone and, based on OCA theory, it stood to lose 
significantly should the global economic climate turn sour.  Classic 
Intergovernmentalist literature accounts for Ireland’s participation from the 
perspective of side-bargains for structural funds or from a lack of alternative 
choices.  However this thesis will demonstrate that Ireland’s positive 
association with EMU can be better explained from the perspective of 
economic identity politics.  Through primary research reviewing the historical 
records of official government debates and the popular press in the periods of 
1978 and 1992, this thesis will present an alternative discourse that shows 
Ireland’s economic decisions were significantly influenced by national identity 
goals.  The institutions of the EMS and EMU created a new Irish monetary 
identity that was an essential part of enhancing its national identity.  In the 
process, Ireland has developed a hybrid nationality, economically and 
monetarily European while still remaining distinctly “Irish”.  
The Formation of Ireland’s Currency 
Ireland’s path to the Euro was a multi-step process beginning with its decision 
to participate in the EMS in 1978, leading to its full commitment to monetary 
union on ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.  These two events were 
essential decision points in Ireland’s economic identity formation.  On both 
occasions Ireland had choices, and both times it opted for further European 
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integration, even in light of strong economic warning bells.  Ireland’s decision 
to join the EMS was significantly more complex than any other state in Europe 
as Ireland had to first sever its 150 year old link with Sterling to join the EMS.  
As a territorial subject of the British crown, the Irish currency was combined 
with Sterling in 1826 and the union remained in place for nearly 100 years 
until the formation of the Irish Free State in 1921.  As noted earlier, political 
identity is inextricably intertwined with monetary sovereignty and it was at the 
forefront of the Irish Government’s mind as it unwound itself from British 
colonial rule.  Following its independence from the UK, Ireland quickly set 
about forming its own currency, which was considered an essential piece of 
promoting its new found independence.  In 1926 the Irish Government 
appointed a Banking Commission to investigate and report on any changes 
that should take place in light of the formation of the Irish Free State. 64  To 
add credibility, the commission was headed by a prior director of the US 
Federal Reserve Board, Dr. Henry Parker-Willis.  The interim report 
recommended that Ireland maintain a fixed peg to Sterling and set up an 
independent non-political organisation called the Currency Commission to 
manage the issuance of notes and oversee currency reserves.  Following the 
commission’s recommendation, the Irish pound65 was created as part of the 
Currency Act of 1927.  The Irish currency would be underpinned with a 
guarantee of total convertibility to Sterling, backed by British Government 
securities, Sterling and gold reserves.  Such was Ireland’s commitment to 
maintaining the hard peg with Sterling that any change or re-valuation would 
require an act of Parliament.66  At that time the UK and Ireland represented as 
close as one can get to an OCA and maintaining a currency union made 
sound economic sense.    However as Mundell noted, monetary sovereignty is 
composed of two distinct elements, namely policy sovereignty and legal 
sovereignty.67  The first describes a country’s ability to set or manage its 
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economic policy and the latter describes the legal right to maintain a 
sovereign currency.  When Ireland entered a fixed exchange peg with Sterling 
it relinquished policy sovereignty to the UK and with it, lost the ability to 
control its inflation or interest rates.  In return, it inherited the stability from 
being pegged to a more powerful international currency and eliminated any 
country-specific exchange rate risk.  It maintained legal sovereignty over its 
currency as the sole issuer of legal tender for Ireland, which it managed 
through the instruments of a currency board.68  As Benjamin Cohen notes, 
currency boards served an important role in presenting the “illusion” of 
national monetary sovereignty and it provided Irish officials with a symbolic 
measure of currency independence.69  The appeal to Ireland’s national 
identity was accomplished through the physical symbolism of its own unique 
currency.  Territorial currencies as national symbols of unification were in 
vogue during the 1920s and Ireland’s currency took on the role of “silent 
ambassadors of national taste”  “to show our national identity”.70   The 
Currency Commission under the chairmanship of the poet William Butler 
Yates used allegories that represented the cultural renaissance of Ireland.  
The notes contained a figure of a woman, wearing a traditional Irish shawl, 
leaning against a harp.  It represented Kathleen Ní Houlihan71, a mythical 
character who was an allegorical representation of Ireland during the political 
struggle for independence.  The harp, another symbol of Irish nationalism, 
was chosen as the emblem on all coinage.  The notes and coins were 
significantly leveraged to create a new Irish identity and reinforce Irish 
nationalism, while on a pragmatic level Ireland was still under the monetary 
control of the UK.   
Throughout the 1960s several studies were undertaken by the Central 
Bank of Ireland to assess the viability of an independent Irish currency.  
However in all cases the analyses recommended maintaining the status quo.  
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Even on entry into the EEC in 1973, Ireland maintained its steadfast link with 
sterling.  But while Ireland maintained its hard peg to Sterling, the Dáil records 
show that the Irish Government grew concerned about the inflationary affects 
of the currency union during the early 1970s.  Britain had suffered significant 
inflationary shocks from the oil crisis of 1973 and a subsequent fall in value 
meant that Ireland suffered significant inflationary impact on imported 
products.  Even so, a 1973 Banking Commission report emphasised that the 
Sterling link was necessary both on the grounds of economic efficiency and 
the survival of the economy.72  Bradley and Whelan note that the Central 
Bank report explicitly invoked Mundell’s theory of OCAs to justify maintaining 
the link with Britain.  Sterling provided Irish politicians with ample reason to 
blame Britain for its economic woes, however no serious considerations were 
expressed in the Dáil records indicating a desire to terminate the 
relationship.73   
The EMS Embryo – Copenhagen 1978 
While monetary integration had been discussed on and off in Brussels since 
the 1950s, it had been plagued with stop-start progress throughout the 
decades.74  The Werner report published in 1970 marked the first serious 
attempt at reviving the goal of monetary union.  It argued for a parallel 
development of economic and monetary integration ultimately leading to an 
irreversible currency union.  According to Kathleen McNamara, the EMS 
emerged as a result of the change in international monetary order as well as 
changing domestic policy away from Keynesian economics to a monetarist 
approach to policy.75  On the international arena, a continued decline in the 
US dollar drove up the Deutschmark, threatening Germany’s export based 
market.  For other European countries plagued with inflation, low growth and 
unemployment, governments began to look to a new model of “economic 
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liberalism” as the way forward.  McNamara argued that monetary participation 
in the EMS was motivated by a preference to adopt the low inflation regime of 
Germany away from Keynesian economics.  Countries like France were 
willing to accept an austerity program in exchange for the low-inflation policies 
of the German monetary regime.76  The reform commitment to monetary 
stabilization is widely viewed as the catalyst that spurred Italy and France to 
participate in the EMS program.  However the Irish Government of 1978 did 
not fit the profile of a fiscally conservative government determined to pursue 
economic policies through the instruments of the EU.  At the time Ireland’s 
government was a major proponent of Keynesian demand management 
policies to stimulate the economy,77  in stark contrast to the policies being 
pursued in countries like France and Germany.  Under the economic policies 
of the Fianna Fáil government, the country experienced an unprecedented 
period of "unbridled pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal expansion" reversing 
years of fiscal contraction.78  Unfortunately McNamara’s argument does not 
provide explanatory insight into Ireland’s participation in the EMS as its 
domestic economic policies were focused in the opposite direction to Europe.   
The proposal for monetary co-operation was first socialized at the European 
Council summit meeting in Copenhagen on April 7, 1978.  However the 
events that followed demonstrate the two-tier approach taken by European 
elites.  There were actually two meetings held at Bremen, the first, a vague 
socialization of monetary union to the Community at large and the second, a 
very specific proposal to a select audience.  At the general Council summit, 
Helmut Schmidt introduced the subject of greater monetary co-operation but it 
is obvious from the Dáil records that little substantive details were provided.  
The Irish government was represented by the Taoiseach79 Jack Lynch and a 
small contingency of his Fianna Fáil Government.   The Taoiseach’s report 
back to the Dáil following the summit reveals that Schmidt’s socialization was 
presented in terms of preliminary investigatory work to be carried out by the 
Commission - as noted in the following passage: 
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“We talked of certain ideas on how the Community could make 
a contribution to world-wide monetary stability that would be 
commensurate with its importance in world trade.  Further 
work is to be done on these ideas within the context of a 
common strategy which we agreed to develop over the coming 
three months and which, in addition to economic and 
monetary affairs, will cover employment, energy, trade, 
industrial affairs and relations with the developing 
world…..The Copenhagen meeting was not an occasion for 
final decisions on action. It concentrated rather on analysis, 
looking forward to decisions at the next meeting in Bremen in 
July and at the so-called World Economic Summit in Bonn 
shortly thereafter.” 80 
 
While one could simply accuse the Taoiseach of obscurantism, Lynch would 
have reveled in bringing back the news of a possible new European monetary 
arrangement to the Dáil, as his party was no friend of the Sterling peg.   
The second meeting, which occurred late in the proceedings after dinner, 
was limited to an exclusive group of European elites including Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt of Germany, President Giscard d’Estaing of France, James 
Callaghan the British Prime Minister and Roy Jenkins the head of the 
European Commission.  At this private meeting the major European powers 
held discussions on dissolving the Snake and creating a new monetary 
system based on a Franco-German proposal.81  News of this meeting was 
broken to the public by the Economist on April 15th, five days after Lynch’s de-
brief to the Dáil.82  The formation of this political splinter group was used 
extensively in the Intergovernmentalist account to explain the power politics of 
monetary union. It also supports Lloyd Gruber’s view that the new currency 
arrangement was primarily a union of the major “winner” currencies pursuing 
a go-it-alone strategy to satisfy their immediate interests. 
 The discussion of a potential monetary union was notably absent from 
Jack Lynch’s debrief, but notably present was the issue of Irish unification 
discussed with Jim Callaghan, the British Prime Minister.  The question of 
power-sharing in Northern Ireland83 and devolution dominated a significant 
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portion of the Dáil debrief with little concern for the issues of European 
monetary integration.  At the time in question, relations between Ireland and 
the United Kingdom were at a heightened level of tension due to increased 
sectarian violence in Northern Ireland.  The Fianna Fáil party was closely 
linked with IRA sentimentality and ran on a platform of total independence for 
Ireland.84  The Irish Government had previously conducted several 
discussions with the British Government to discuss some power sharing 
arrangement for Northern Ireland.  However Callaghan was simultaneously 
implementing legislation that increased the level of Northern Ireland 
participation in the British Parliament in Westminster, sending a clear signal 
that devolution was not on the table.85  The following passage underlines the 
tension in the meeting between the two heads of government at the 
Copenhagen Summit: 
“I mentioned our belief that the only basis for permanent 
peace and stability and a harmonious relationship between 
Britain and Ireland is the coming together of the people of 
Ireland under agreed structures. I said that we thought that 
progress towards this objective would be facilitated if the 
British Government were to declare its interest in Irish unity 
and join with us in working towards that end. The difference 
between us on this issue was clearly and frankly 
acknowledged.”86  
 
Early in the Dáil record it became clear that what should be a technocratic 
discussion on monetary sovereignty was conflated with political discussions of 
Irish unification and nationalism.  A Government monetary brief produced 
after the Copenhagen summit highlights the frustration with the perceived 
dependency relationship between Britain and Ireland.  It noted that its 
inherited monetary constraints forced the Irish pound to “appreciate and 
depreciate willy-nilly with Sterling”.87  The Irish Government report was 
optimistic that the proposed monetary system would provide external control 
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from Europe to rein in and stabilise Sterling.  At this point Ireland presumed 
that Britain would be part of the new monetary arrangement and it clearly had 
not considered an alternative situation where Ireland would have to enter 
alone.   
Who Speaks For Irish Monetary Policy? 
Prior to the Bremen Summit, held on July 7th 1978, there was a dearth of 
dialog regarding the EMS in both the Irish newspapers and Dáil debates, even 
though it was being broadly discussed in Britain.  The Dáil record shows that 
between April and July no further discussion was held on the proposal for a 
new European Monetary System.  Instead, Ireland’s crippling economy, 
unemployment and the escalating violence in Northern Ireland were at the 
forefront of Irish political debate.  The lack of dialog was notable given the 
gravity of the potential economic impact on Ireland, but the impact would only 
be felt if Ireland were to enter the EMS without Britain.  As long as they 
entered together, the currency union could be maintained and no exchange 
rate differential would disrupt trade between them.  As such, it points to a 
presumption by the Irish Government that Britain was committed to monetary 
cooperation with its European counterparts.   Irish officials participated in 
several meetings of ECOFIN and the Committee of Central Bankers over the 
following months to formulate a proposal for the European Commission.  
Meanwhile the “Group of Three”88 was privately working on a competing plan 
as it wanted to keep the new system out of the hands of Central bankers and 
European Commission elites.89  This negates any Neofunctionalist 
explanation of state cooperation that presents the process of institution 
creation as a system of “collective action”.  This example highlights that the 
German and French elites had alternative motives to derail any EU-wide 
negotiated institutional arrangement.     
The events of the Bremen Summit were to serve as a painful reminder 
for Ireland that it lacked credibility within the European community, both as an 
independent voice for the Irish state and a relevant player in European 
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monetary politics.  Immediately prior to the Summit, the proponents of the 
Schmidt-d’Estaing plan socialized their proposal to other EEC members but 
neglected to brief Ireland, giving the perception that the UK spoke for Irish 
monetary policy. 90  As the country with the most complex decision to make, it 
was not even afforded a place at the discussion table.  The French and 
German governments had assumed that Britain would have engaged with 
Ireland and therefore neglected to update it directly.  This seemingly minor 
oversight had a major impact on the Irish Government’s response to the new 
monetary system. 91  Firstly, it highlighted the fact that Ireland was perceived 
to be part of Britain and secondly, Britain was seen as the authoritative voice 
to speak for Ireland’s monetary policy.  Honohan and Murphy note how 
Giscard d’Estaing even assumed that the UK’s initial rejection of the monetary 
proposal was taken to assume that it represented the Irish stance too.  
Following this oversight it became clear to the Irish Government 
representatives that its status as an independent sovereign nation was in 
contestation.  Among the European elites, Ireland suffered an identity deficit 
as a sovereign independent voice for economic policy.  Worse still, its voice 
was assumed to be represented by its long term adversary, the UK.  With 
relations between Callaghan and Lynch already strained, this seemingly minor 
oversight became the turning point to embolden Ireland’s nationalist 
government, as it was clear that Europe did not attach a voice to Ireland for its 
monetary policy decisions.  Ireland had to assert its economic independence 
through its monetary policy; a vote to stay with Sterling would reinforce its UK 
association; a vote for the EMS represented its sovereign independence to 
decide monetary policy.   
During the Bremen meetings, President Giscard d’Estaing and 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt presented their formal proposal for European 
Monetary Union.  With the French and German Governments present, Jack 
Lynch “explicitly aired his grievance” at the way Ireland had been treated and 
asked that Ireland be afforded “the same type of consultation that other 
members had in a matter of this nature”.92  To add insult to injury, in spite of 
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Jack Lynch’s protestation at being overlooked in Bremen, Ireland was 
rendered the same treatment some weeks later.  As further evidence of 
Ireland’s lack of sovereign credibility within the EEC, at the Bonn Summit of 
Western powers, Mr Lynch was issued further embarrassment by being 
excluded from access to an advance briefing on the proposed currency union.  
As noted by one Irish official "we had to ferret the information out for 
ourselves" and while Mr. Lynch once again issued a soft protest against 
Ireland’s total neglect, it was clear that he was not afforded the respect of a 
sovereign head of state in the negotiations.93  Any doubt the Irish Government 
had on the validity of its status as an independent nation in Europe was 
cemented after its treatment at Bonn. 
Honohan notes how government documents reveal that Lynch entered 
the Bremen Summit proceedings with a predetermined intent to act 
independently of Britain, even if it meant breaking the 150 year old link with 
Sterling.  This “independence” was reflected in Ireland’s initial press interview 
following the summit as Lynch expressed enthusiastic support for the new 
monetary regime even though the details and implications were barely 
understood.  The Economist confirms that the Taoiseach had openly 
expressed a very positive response to the EMS.94 It notes how “the most 
surprising supporter is Ireland.  Mr Jack Lynch is quite prepared to enter the 
new zone even if Britain holds back, and thus cut the link between the British 
and Irish pounds.”  
From the tone of Jack Lynch’s quotes in the Irish newspapers, it is 
clear that nationalist goals were an essential motivation for his expression of 
support and his message back to the Irish reinforced this.  The language 
reiterated his economic independence to both the home audience and may 
well have been directed at British and European elites too: "While tied to 
sterling, we have always held that we have the capacity to leave the sterling 
club if and when it suits us".95   Lynch went on to state that the new monetary 
scheme “made a break with sterling a practical possibility for the first time in 
the history of the state”.   Later that month the Irish Times sarcastically noted 
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that "to judge …. by the Government's tone generally, it seems to be 
infatuated by a sneaking notion of grandeur - that it could be the one to go 
down in the history books as having given Ireland her own currency".96  Given 
the focus of language on the break with sterling rather than implications of the 
new monetary system, it highlights the symbolic tension of the Sterling/Irish 
relationship.  The record contradicts the notion that Ireland joined because it 
had no other choice.  It was an enthusiastic proponent of the new system from 
its first socialization, as it provided a means to extricate Ireland from the 
unfinished nationalist goal of creating a truly independent nation.  The link 
with Sterling was a sore reminder that Ireland had not yet accomplished what 
it set out to do in 1921 and its economic policy reinforced its dependency on 
the UK, as an economic marketplace and a monetary authority.  Lynch’s 
assertion of his right to speak on behalf of Ireland – by expressing positive 
support for the EMS – had begun the process of completing Ireland’s 
psychological independence from Britain.  It was not based on any rational 
calculation of economic preferences even though Ireland was well versed on 
the economic limitations of breaking the link with Sterling.  The indignity of 
being treated as an appendage of the UK had invigorated a tremendous 
sense of nationalism within the Fianna Fáil party that emboldened it to shed 
Ireland’s traditionally conservative stance on maintaining the Sterling link.97   
This rendering of the empirical evidence contradicts Lloyd Gruber’s 
Intergovernmentalist view that Ireland found itself in a “loser” situation with no 
choice but to join.  In fact Ireland could have let the UK be the bad guy of the 
negotiations and simply have ridden its coattails.  Ireland was well positioned 
to remain with Sterling without experiencing too much EEC backlash and in 
fact this would have been its best near term option.  As evidenced in Bremen 
and Bonn, the EU hardly acknowledged Ireland’s presence other than an 
offshoot of Britain to begin with.  But the price of capturing its sovereign 
national identity was the short term economic cost of joining the EMS.  As 
such, the ideational goals influenced economic policy and shaped Ireland’s 
decisions. The only loss that Ireland perceived it suffered from was being 
treated an economically independent entity.  If the argument that Ireland had 
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no choice held true then one would expect the Irish response to be caged 
while it held out for the best possible bargain from Europe.  At this early 
juncture in the process, little was known about the format of the system yet 
Ireland had already expressed its strong support even before it was even 
clear the EMS would ever materialise.   
Rational Economics vs. Irish National Identity 
Reading the transcripts from the official government debate which took place 
after the Dáil reconvened, it is evident that the Government’s mind was all but 
made up and the economic logic was framed to validate the national purpose.  
Fianna Fáil highlighted that Ireland’s economic issues were an artefact of its 
colonial linkage to Sterling.  The government claimed that Ireland would 
benefit from being linked to a stronger Deutschmark, even though all the 
economic experts disagreed.  Prior to the Dáil Debate in October, a 
conference of leading economists and intellectuals in Dublin questioned the 
Government’s logic on joining the EMS.  Dr. Terence Ryan a Trinity College 
economist noted that the recent upsurge in the Irish economy was due to its 
link with Sterling and the “euphoria” of the Government was questionable 
given the expected deflationary effect of joining the EMS.  He cautioned that it 
was inappropriate to join the stronger currency band of the EMS at this time 
and his warning was echoed by Mary Robinson who argued that the 
Government’s unqualified enthusiasm was driven by nationalist sentiment 
rather than economic logic.98  The general economic view was that without 
significant fiscal transfers, the deflationary impact of the EMS currency link 
would cripple the economy.   
At the Dáil Debate the language of the Taoiseach was framed in a way 
that associated the UK (and consequently Ireland) with “weakness” and the 
EMS and Deutschmark with “strength”.  The Taoiseach was pragmatic in 
relation to Ireland’s monetary sovereignty noting that “As a small open 
economy, our freedom of action in currency matters is inevitably restricted”99  
However he quickly drew attention to the “suffering” Ireland endured under a 
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system that Ireland had been tied to since its foundation.  The language 
projected a resolve to pursue a monetary policy independent of the UK while 
simultaneously appealing to national sentiment by highlighting the damage 
rendered to the economy from Ireland’s dependency on Sterling.  
While the opposition parties acknowledged that EMS entry could be a 
good long run goal for Ireland, both Fine Gael and Labour argued that the 
timing of entry could prove disastrous to the Irish economy, which was the 
weakest and poorest in Europe.  The leader of Fine Gael, Dr. Garrett 
Fitzgerald led a highly technocratic debate on the economic risks to European 
monetary integration. 100   Dr. Fitzgerald accused the government of rushing in 
to announce their commitment to the new system “with an enthusiasm that 
has drastically reduced their bargaining power”.  Noting that Ireland’s 
economy was “not sufficiently strong to go into the European Monetary 
System under the terms proposed”, it would require Ireland to take serious 
deflationary measures in order to bring its inflation rate in line with Germany.  
He continued by arguing that since joining the EEC in 1973, there had been 
no convergence between the Irish and German economies, and in fact Ireland 
had diverged further.  Fitzgerald noted that Ireland was “worse placed than 
any other country…to enter the EMS” and it would take a massive injection of 
aid to enable Ireland to remain within the system without very damaging 
economic effects. 101  Should the Irish pound strengthen against Sterling, as 
was the prevailing belief, Ireland would be overvalued against the bulk of its 
export market which serviced the UK and USA.102  The economic debate 
validates the fact that the Irish government and opposition were keenly aware 
of the economic implications of the decision at stake.   
Throughout the debate it is clear that in the eyes of the political elites, 
the decision was squarely in Ireland’s control and there was no external 
pressure forcing Ireland into this economic quandary.   Neither Britain nor 
Europe was threatening, coercing or cajoling Ireland into joining the EMS and 
the lack of dialog on Europe suggests that it didn’t care one way or the other.  
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Dr. Fitzgerald also questioned the speed of passage of the proposal by 
President Chirac and Chancellor Schmidt, leaving little time for other countries 
to study the full implications of the measure.  In the following section, 
Fitzgerald highlights that the EMS served the recent interests of France and 
Germany.  Fitzgerald noted that the idea originated from “a meeting between 
two heads of State who committed themselves very strongly to the 
establishment of this system [EMS] without explaining very clearly what had 
led them to this overnight conversion from the evident skepticism they had 
shown throughout the previous five years”.103  This account confirms the 
Intergovernmental assessment that the EMS was primarily in the interest of 
France and Germany and they planned to proceed irrespective of who else 
joined.   
Ultimately the Dáil debate reduced to a rational economic debate 
against the EMS versus a nationalist debate on Ireland’s link with Sterling.  It 
was clear to the Government that in the eyes of European elites, Ireland 
neither possessed monetary independence nor the voice to speak for it.  
Neither was Ireland considered a stakeholder in institution building in the EU.  
By remaining with Sterling, the Irish Government would have remained a 
contested economic identity within the context of Europe.  In closing the 
debate Dr. O’Donoghue104 of Fianna Fail accused the opposition parties of 
“weakness” by not acknowledging that an Irish Government was capable of 
exercising its freedom to independently decide what was best for the Irish 
people.  Dr. O’Donoghue’s comments capture the essence of the sentiment of 
what was at stake for Fianna Fáil: 
“I want to pick a remark which at first struck me as 
incongruous and inappropriate. The Labour Party Leader, 
Deputy Cluskey, said that Fianna Fáil had a romantic 
approach to this subject [EMS entry]; we had this romantic 
idea of breaking the link with sterling…..on reflection he was 
right. We do stand convicted as romantics. …… It implies 
having a belief in the Irish people, a commitment to shaping 
our own affairs, to exercising the power that has been 
conferred on an independent Government, to adopting a truly 
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republican stance and saying “It is Government of the people 
for the people”.  Whether it results in mistakes or in the right 
conclusions the crucial thing is for the Government of the day, 
whoever they are, to have this romantic approach, to believe 
in things; above all to believe that there is a way in which 
Ireland can play its part among the nations of the earth and 
make a contribution. We do not have to suffer from a massive 
national inferiority complex; we do not have to spend our time 
tied to mother England's apron strings rather than run the risk 
of developing any monetary or other policies of our own.”105 
This speech highlights how the Irish Government was willing to incur 
the painful sacrifice of economic dislocation in order to reinforce Ireland’s 
position as a truly independent political entity within Europe.  For Ireland, the 
EMS represented the new cultural space that enabled it to distance itself from 
its colonial “other” as part of the new monetary regime.  With their policy 
preference already publicly stated, and with a 20 seat majority in power, the 
opposition had no chance of stopping Fianna Fáil. 
The Irish Government was fully aware that it had little chance of 
operating an independent currency; it could either be part of Sterling or part of 
the Deutschmark.  The question for Jack lynch was not which currency was 
economically better or stronger but who got to decide Ireland’s monetary 
policy.  Ireland’s economic identity was at stake in the form of independence 
to choose.  Without a firm stance by the Government, Ireland could continue 
indefinitely under a power relationship that it had been trying to undo for 
hundreds of years - even if that power relationship made sound economic 
sense.  As long as Ireland remained with Sterling, the UK exerted “power 
over” Ireland through the currency link, and shadowing the UK reinforced the 
power relationship in the minds of other countries too.  However by choosing 
to go with the EMS Ireland was accorded the “power to” determine its own 
economic future and established its legitimacy as a sovereign state within 
Europe. 
The review of the historical record is consistent with the 
Intergovernmentalist account from the perspective of how France and 
Germany operated in the creation of the EMS.  However it also shows that the 
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narrow field of analysis was too exclusionary to explain Ireland’s participation, 
such that the “no-choice” option looked like the likely answer.  The Irish 
decision highlights how the Intergovernmentalist focus on bargaining alone 
led to an inaccurate conclusion on Ireland’s participation in the EMS.  The 
total lack of fiscal transfers confirms that Ireland’s bargaining position was 
negligible, and Germany or France had no interest in bargaining for Ireland’s 
entry. 106  With no promise of economic respite, rational choice theory would 
have directed Ireland to remain with Sterling where it would have fared better, 
but instead it chose the EMS.  Ireland was neither forced into joining due to 
lack of alternatives nor chose to join because of the side bargains it received.  
Its decision was first and foremost driven by economic identity politics which 
drove a nationalist vision to distance itself from Britain (the “other”) towards a 
new national identity to be created around the EMS.  In turn, the Irish 
government was willing to undertake the economic sacrifice to meet its 
national goal and when the EMS came into existence on March 13th 1993, 
Ireland was one of its founding members.107   
A Decade of Economic Sacrifice 
The promise of lower inflation and interest rate through convergence 
towards the German economy never materialised throughout the following ten 
years.  Independent studies confirm that Ireland suffered significant economic 
dislocation following the move to the EMS.108  While Ireland eventually 
managed to reduce inflation, throughout the early 1980s inflation peaked at 
over 20%.  Ireland experienced negative growth in the economy for the five 
years between 1980 and 1985.  Public debt grew to over 140% of GNP and 
Ireland’s unemployment rate climbed to 19.5% in 1988.109   In addition, 
instead of Ireland’s interest rate premium converging to the hard currencies of 
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Europe it remained significantly higher than both the UK and Germany due to 
lack of domestic fiscal credibility.110   
In describing Ireland’s experience in the EMS, Central Banker Padraic 
O’Connor noted that the Central Bank had warned that the benefits of a 
strong exchange rate regime could not be enjoyed unless it was accompanied 
by an anti-inflationary stance in other policy areas.  Without this, the country 
would eventually have to endure low growth and high unemployment or it 
would have to devalue the currency.111  Ireland experienced both cases as its 
Keynesian fiscal policies did not match an anti-inflationary policy being 
adopted in Europe.  O’Connor concluded that joining the EMS had made the 
Irish pound weaker as Irish inflation persistently converged towards the UK 
inflation rate between 1979 and 1985, not towards Germany, and it would 
have benefited from lower inflation sooner had it remained linked to sterling 
(see Chart 1). 112  
 
Chart 1:  Irish inflation and Unemployment rates 1978-1988 
 
Source:  Irish Central Statistics Office 
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Finally Ireland did not significantly benefit from the promised growth in 
European trade.  While the break with Sterling hurt Irish trade with the UK 
over the coming years the majority of the growth came from outside of 
Europe, in particular the USA (See Chart 2).  Ireland continued to remain a 
peripheral economy within the European Union and at the next major juncture 
in European Monetary integration in 1992, Ireland still was the least 
synchronised economy in Europe.   
 
Chart 2:  Distribution of Irish Trade 1978-1985 
 
Source: Irish Central Statistics Office113 
*ROW = Rest of World 
 
However in the process of joining the EMS, Ireland had “grown up” 
economically and monetarily.  Ireland had no experience of major bank 
operations while linked to Sterling.114   Although Ireland technically had a 
Central Bank in place when it entered the EMS, its role had been largely 
symbolic without the ability to set reserve requirements, manage open market 
operations, set discount rates or mange credit controls.  In fact, Ireland did not 
even have the capability to print its own money as it had depended on the 
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Royal mint and UK printers for its currency.  Therefore the process of 
monetary independence provided a significant learning period for the Irish 
government.  As Honohan noted, “Overall, Ireland's experience with an 
independent currency in the years of the EMS was not a very happy one.”115  The 
brief period of the “Punt”116 left a negative identification within Ireland and he 
notes that it may have swayed Ireland’s preference for the EMU.  Ultimately 
the period from 1978 to 1992 solidified Ireland’s economic independence, for 
better or worse. 
Given such a negative outlook one would expect a more calculated 
approach to the Maastricht Treaty to ratify the European Union and EMU 
formation.  The memory of the huge economic and social cost that Ireland 
experienced under the EMS was still at the forefront of Ireland’s mind.   One 
would predict that Ireland approach complete monetary integration with 
significantly more caution than when it entered the EMS.  In contrast to 
rational expectation, this next section will demonstrate that Ireland’s response 
to full monetary union was widely embraced by all sectors of Irish political life.  
While Ireland was no closer to being part of a Europe-wide OCA, it proved 
one of the most enthusiastic supporters of EMU.  Contrary to the general 
European sentiment in 1992, Ireland was more than happy to relinquish 
monetary sovereignty to a supranational arrangement.  In fact, while many 
European countries balked over the loss of identity associated with 
relinquishing its national currency, Ireland mocked the nationalist attachment 
to monetary sovereignty.   
In 1992, Ireland was still the least synchronised economy within the 
European Union with a trade pattern that was disproportionally dependant on 
the UK and USA market for exports.117  This asymmetry with mainland Europe 
would mean that Ireland’s interest rate demands would not be satisfactorily 
met by the EMU, leaving it significantly more vulnerable to exogenous 
economic shocks than any prior monetary arrangement.118  Hay et al. note 
how the Irish financial papers and leading economists had highlighted the 
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constraints that EMU membership would place on Ireland’s economic 
autonomy.  Of particular concern, was its potential to lose competitiveness 
vis-à-vis the US and UK in the event of a significant rise in the value of the 
Euro.  Yet in spite of a generally negative experience under the EMS and 
economic signs that argued against further integration, Irish support for further 
monetary integration was dramatically higher in 1992 than in 1978.   
In theory the 1992 Maastricht Treaty should have proven significantly 
more challenging for the government as it required a full constitutional 
amendment that had to be ratified by the Irish plebiscite.  The treaty 
referendum brought the decision into the forefront of national engagement in a 
way that was absent in 1978.  With a public to convince one would have 
expected heated debates for and against integration, yet as the record 
showed, the event was marked more by the lack of any substantive debate.  
The debates contained little of the economic banter of 1978 and it appeared 
that monetary union was a no brainer.   
Ireland Support for EMU 
The 1992 decision was clear-cut from the outset as far as all the major 
political parties were concerned - Ireland had to join the EMU.  While Jacques 
Delors, the European Commissioner was courting Irish politicians with a 
promise of further fiscal transfers, Ireland could have chosen to negotiate 
partial entry into the EU as Britain and Denmark did.  Europe had shown that 
it was willing to negotiate “opt-out” terms and Ireland had already received 
some exclusion clauses on political neutrality.  Yet Ireland proved to be an 
ardent supporter of the EMU. The following section highlights how economic 
identity politics again played a significant role in guiding Ireland’s decision to 
pursue complete monetary integration in defiance of economic warnings.  In 
particular three major themes emerged on reviewing the Dáil debate leading 
up to the Maastricht Treaty referendum; firstly, Ireland paid little homage to 
monetary sovereignty; secondly, the country rallied behind a vision to build an 
economically modern state and shed its image as the “blacks” of Europe; and 
finally, Ireland saw the EU as a way to regain its vision for a “United” Ireland. 
 45 
Economic Sovereignty Debunked 
The most striking aspect of the Irish government debate on the Maastricht 
Treaty was the near complete absence of dialog about the potential negative 
economic impact of full monetary union.  The grand bargain theories paint a 
picture of carefully calculated intergovernmental bargaining in return for the 
acquiescence of monetary sovereignty.  By contrast the Dáil debate reveals 
that Ireland was almost blasé in its treatment of monetary sovereignty, and 
only a fringe group of “naysayers” addressed the potential downside impact 
from joining the EMU.119  There was near unanimous agreement among the 
leading political parties, industry elites, trade unions, farmers’ organizations, 
women’s organizations and industry associations that Europe would 
significantly “enhance” Ireland’s position as a strong economy within 
Europe.120   
In his opening speech the Fianna Fáil Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds 
emphasised the centrality of monetary union in the building of a “new Europe”.  
From the tone of the debate, Ireland seemed positively enthusiastic about 
monetary union in contrast to much of Europe.   According to Reynolds “The 
kernel of the treaty is the single currency”121 and for Ireland to be able to 
participate in the benefits of the European Union, it was seen as essential that 
it support the currency initiative.  He referenced the ideological debate on 
sovereignty that had paralysed much of Europe and reiterated the importance 
of not becoming embroiled in a sovereignty argument as had happened in 
Denmark. Just days before, the Danes had rejected the Maastricht treaty 
largely on the grounds of sovereignty.  Instead he argued that the surrender of 
monetary sovereignty would in fact “enhance our standing in Europe”.122  In 
return, Reynolds noted that the European Union would provide the foundation 
for economic confidence and prosperity that Ireland desperately needed.  The 
small price that Ireland had to pay for enhancing its economic standing in the 
world was to relinquish monetary authority.  The political leaders argued that 
Ireland’s loss of monetary sovereignty was nominal as the EMS had left it with 
                                                
119
 Socialist Workers Party and Sinn Fein were considered the “naysayers” against the Treaty,  Irish 
Times, "Mcgiolla Urges No on Maastricht," Irish Times, May 25th 1992. 
120
 ———, "Industrialists and Ifa Rally Behind Treaty," Irish Times, June 4th 1992. 
121
 Oireachtas, "European Union Treaty: Statements ". p. 1928 
122
 ———, "European Union Treaty: Statements," Dáil Debates Vol. 420 (June 3rd, 1992). p.1357 
 46 
little real control over monetary policy to begin with.  As one politician noted, 
“the loss of sovereignty…is more apparent than real….We retain nominal 
power but the real decisions are made elsewhere”123  Mr. Alan Dukes, deputy-
leader of the Fine Gael party added that the Westphalian notion of 
sovereignty had eroded worldwide since the Second World War and countries 
like Ireland had little control over the global economy:   
“We are price takers….we do not determine interest rates…we 
do not determine our exchange rate…..we do not determine 
these things because as an economic actor on the world stage 
we are too small to have an influence.  This notion of giving up 
sovereignty, which is being advanced as an objection to 
signing the Maastricht Treaty is false, you cannot give up 
something which you never had” .124   
 
Ireland did not seem to place any emphasis on sovereignty as an instrument 
of state power.  In fact Ireland’s lack of concern about the loss of sovereignty 
may in fact have been its greatest bargaining tool because it projected such a 
positive attitude to European integration and in particular the EMU.  The short 
and chequered history of the Punt had ingrained a negative connotation in the 
minds of the Irish and the opportunity to be part of a new currency was seen 
as highly positive.   
Long Term Economic Vision for Society 
The Government rhetoric and public debate highlights that the EMU was 
associated with a vision of what Ireland could become in the future.  With the 
recent memory of economic dislocation on its mind, Ireland experienced a 
huge transformation in attitude to pull itself out of its economic decline.  It 
began re-inventing its economy through a public-private social partnership, 
turning the external constraints of the European Union into economic 
opportunity.125  Ireland was in the throes of developing its own economic 
platform by leveraging its position as the “gateway to Europe” through the 
attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as the foundation of its economic 
base.  The new European regional block spurred US and Japanese 
companies to look for ways to circumvent “Fortress Europe”.  By relocating 
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within the European Union, multinationals had complete access to the 
European market as nationally imposed restrictions on imports were 
eliminated.   As noted by Heinz Weihrich, peripheral countries like Ireland and 
Spain, with little indigenous competitive industry, were considered possible 
alliances for American firms wishing to locate within Europe.126  As one of the 
most liberal OECD countries, with a well educated english speaking 
workforce, Ireland stood to be the major beneficiary of transnational 
investment within the European regional block.127  With a history of reaching 
out to its North American Diaspora, Ireland already had established strong 
connections within US political and industrial circles.128  Government 
participants in the Dáil debate noted that Ireland’s success at attracting FDI 
was directly linked to its location within the European community and its 
economic strategy was dependent on capitalizing on the opportunities created 
by the formation of the European Union.   
Ireland’s new economic identity was being built on top of the 
institutions of the European Union (the regional trading block, the tariff free 
internal market and a common trading currency) and monetary sovereignty 
was a small price to pay for the huge benefits that Ireland envisioned through 
extra-regional investment.  The response of the Irish Government to loss of 
sovereignty shows how sovereignty is to a great degree what countries 
believe it stands for. It does not necessarily follow the same prescription for all 
states that the rationalist argument of IR scholarship upholds.    
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Europe as a New Cultural Identity 
 “Do you not get it, lads? The Irish are the blacks of Europe”129. 
       The Commitments, 1991 
 
The perception of the Irish as “the blacks of Europe” was succinctly captured 
in the 1991 film “The Commitments” and reflects the national psyche at that 
time.  A key element of the Dáil debate was the need for Ireland to shed its 
image as the backwater of Europe, and the creation of a new identity away 
from its prior self became a central theme in Ireland’s Maastricht debate.  A 
major focus of government and public rhetoric was on building a vision of 
modern Ireland evolving to a more economically and culturally sophisticated 
society.  Its economic strategy was seen to be an essential element in 
creating this new image.   A “no” vote was associated with backwardness and 
regression while a “yes” vote was an endorsement of Ireland as a part of 
Europe’s new regional block.  Whereas in 1978 the “other” was clearly Britain, 
in 1992 the “other” was “black” Ireland whose economy remained 
underdeveloped relative to the rest of Europe.  Framing the language in terms 
of “idealism” and “political maturing” a yes vote was a vote for modernity and 
progress while a no vote was “a conscious decision to remain in an Irish 
backwater”.130  European Union was painted as part of a long term strategic 
vision to provide opportunities for the youth of Ireland that the current 
generation never had access to.  One politician noted how “to find [Ireland] 
excluded from any policy area designated as a core activity of the European 
Union would be a serious breach of a strategy first elaborated by Sean 
Lemass in the early 1960s and would be a disgrace, both for Ireland’s self-
image and for its role in the Europe of the 21st century”131.   
The theme of a “new Europe” was used throughout the debate as if it 
was a restart for the entire continent and Ireland was simply one of the 
building blocks.  The European Union would allow Ireland to reincarnate itself 
in a “new Europe”.  The alternative “no” vote framed Ireland as “isolated” and 
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an “outsider”.  As Brigid Laffan notes, the exclusive language of the European 
Union became an integral part of the discourse on integration: 
“The term Europe has been appropriated by the EU for itself.  
The term ‘rejoining Europe” or “returning to Europe” 
highlighted the fact that since the 1950s the European Union 
was institutionalised in Western Europe as the dominant 
framework above the level of the state.  Acceptance as a 
candidate country carried with it a powerful marker of inclusion 
and identification as “European” however ambitious that term 
remains.  From the outset, the EU – through membership and 
non-membership, inclusion and exclusion – has exercised a 
powerful impact on state identity in Europe.”132 
 
In an impassioned editorial piece in the Irish Times, Mary Holland noted how 
a German journalist considered Slavs and Tartars, “not really Europeans at 
all”.  Holland commented that “We in this country have experience of being on 
the receiving end of that kind of attitude.  We know, too, the enormous 
courage it takes psychologically, as well as politically, to break free from the 
bonds of history and shape a new society after years, centuries even, of 
oppression.  Our membership of Europe has helped us in this.”133  
 At a social level an abortion debate became intertwined with 
Maastricht, as traditional Catholics lobbied for a “no” vote while progressives 
looked to Europe as the way to divest Ireland’s theocratic, paternalistic 
past.134  Europe was seen as a countervailing force against “traditional 
conservatives in Irish society”.  A return to “narrow nationalism” would be a 
serious backward move for Ireland, the “no” vote was associated with 
"isolationists and fundamentalists"135 who would “leave the Irish people as 
second-class citizens within the European Community”136.  This sentiment 
was echoed in the general public rhetoric, as one private citizen noted: “I 
cannot wait to get out of our national straitjacket, with its closed minds, its 
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repressed and oppressive society, its religious zealotry and bigotry and its 
triumphalist nationalism”.137   
Economic Policy to Enhance National Goals 
Mirroring Fianna Fáil’s message in 1978, European integration was 
also seen as a way to capture Ireland’s long term vision for Irish Unification.  
The Taoiseach argued that Europe would provide a framework for peace and 
reconciliation and he warned that a no vote would reinforce partition with the 
North as the UK was expected to endorse the EU.  The leader of the Fine 
Gael party, John Bruton, noted that the European Union allowed the North 
and South of Ireland to share a common platform of economic 
interdependence “without the supremacy of one tradition over another”.138  As 
part of “new Europe” the South and North of Ireland would be united in a 
neutral space that allowed mutual interdependence to flourish, leading to long 
term peace.  The institutions of Europe allowed both societies to develop in 
tandem without one being subsumed to the other.  European integration 
created an ahistorical space with no past baggage which allowed the two 
Irelands to redefine themselves in a new economic context. As noted by one 
politician, “It is a noble and exciting prospect that after 800 years of 
domination by our nearest neighbours…we will now participate in the building 
of the new Europe of free and equal citizens”.139  Ironically the path to Irish 
unification and long lasting peace could only occur through the rejection of 
national sovereignty and national claim on territory in return for a shared 
transnational entity. 
Yet coincident with the message that Europe offered greater 
independence for Ireland, the political elites simultaneously stressed that 
Ireland was not being asked to surrender or undermine its own identity.  
Participation in the EMU was presented as a means to enhance rather than 
diminish the Irish national identity.  As noted by one politician in a newspaper 
interview prior to the Maastricht vote "If we go forward we face the future with 
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pride and confidence, dedicating our talents to building a new Ireland in a new 
Europe, proud of being Irish in the new Europe.”140 
In summary, Ireland’s second foray with monetary union demonstrates 
how the economic decision making was framed as an integral part of the 
nascence of a new national identity.  This national vision was built on a self 
confidence that would follow from greater economic integration with the 
outside world and the economic benefits it would provide.  By focusing on a 
shared economic vision it explains how Irish citizens so overwhelmingly 
supported an international economic policy which had imposed significant 
economic dislocation and could do so again in the future.  This does not deny 
that Ireland’s elites were not concerned with maximizing their interests in 
terms of lobbying for structural funds.  While the structural funds were 
mentioned, they compromised little of the Dáil or other Irish public debates.  In 
fact, there was a hint of embarrassment that Ireland would be viewed as going 
to Europe with a “begging-bowl”141 in hand.  Instead the political elites talked 
about appealing to Ireland’s idealistic vision of being part of Europe. The 
European Union was an instrument in Ireland’s nationalist goal to advance its 
economy within Europe.  Throughout the debate proceedings there was no 
indication of pressure or coercion from European elites or threats of retaliation 
if Ireland chose a path similar to Denmark or the UK.  In fact, Ireland outright 
rejected the Danish decision as an example of narrow nationalism.  Instead 
the debate was framed in terms of the power that lay within the Irish populace 
to transform itself.  A yes vote would give Ireland the power to alter its national 
identity through the economic policy it pursued.   
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Ireland’s New National Identity   
Alan Milward argues that small European States have a distinct interest in 
European regional integration which can enhance their own sense of identity. 
Therefore the way that they approach supranational organizations is different 
from larger states.142  Small states are unable to participate in 
intergovernmental grand-bargaining therefore their approach to Europe is 
more pragmatic.  The decoupling of rights and identity (legal and cultural) 
dimensions of nationality were easy for Ireland because it had always 
operated within a framework of limited monetary sovereignty.  Its legal 
sovereignty was not significantly diminished moving from a Sterling peg to the 
EMS or the EMU, but with each stage its national identity was enhanced.  
Economic identity politics provides a more meaningful framework to explain 
Ireland’s seemingly irrational participation in supranational institutions such as 
the EMS and EMU because national identity, not economic instrumentality or 
power politics, was the driving force for the economic policies pursued.  As 
Dyson notes, the EMU is often portrayed as “an inexorable process of 
dissolving national identities, undermining domestic political structures, and 
removing national sovereignty over economic policy”.143  The problem with 
this rational instrumentalist representation is that it views sovereignty and 
identity in absolutist terms such that a loss in one equates to a loss in the 
other, therefore a reduction in state sovereign control equates to a loss in 
national identity.  However, Ireland’s experience contradicts the rationalist 
view because it participated in monetary union as part of an economic policy 
choice to enhance its identity as a sovereign state, not because it had “no 
choice”.  If Ireland had pursued a purely rational approach to monetary policy 
it is likely that it would have not joined the EMS in 1978, and would have 
approached the Maastricht treaty with much greater caution than was shown 
in the government records on the lead up to the 1992 referendum.    
 The 1978 decision to break from Sterling and join the EMS was 
motivated by the political desire to assert Ireland’s sovereignty within the 
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context of the EU as an independent sovereign state not as an outcrop of 
Britain.  The events leading up to the formation of the EMS made it clear to 
Ireland’s leaders that the European powers did not consider Ireland separate 
from the UK and it was not afforded the same treatment as other members of 
the European community.  Breaking the sterling link and joining the EMS, at 
whatever economic cost to society, was a necessary step to establish 
Ireland’s psychological independence both at home and in Brussels.  While 
Ireland’s decision defies rational economic choice due to the cost it leveraged 
on its citizens, joining the EMS established the political legitimacy of Ireland 
within the European community. It simultaneously served to complete 
Ireland’s independence from Britain by distancing itself economically from its 
prior colonizer, forcing it to build its own economic capability.  As Paul 
Gillespie notes, Ireland had never broken free from its post-colonial 
dependency following independence and the world wars.  He argued that “In a 
sense, EC/EU membership represented the fulfilment of Irish 
independence”144  through its participation in the sovereignty sharing 
institutions of Europe.  The process of integrating Ireland within the EU 
monetary framework allowed it to tap into its American Diaspora to build an 
independent economic strategy.  In spite of the economic hardship Ireland 
endured during the 1980s, the EU psychologically broke the dependency 
cycle that Ireland existed in, under the weight of its colonial past.  Essentially, 
Ireland grew up economically through the EMS and learned to stand on its 
own shaky feet.  The Irish government was well aware of the economic 
consequences that could - and did - result from its decision, but economic 
logic would not have brought Ireland the economic maturity it needed.  The 
EMS provided Ireland an institutional framework to take the first steps on the 
road to economic independence from Britain.   
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which was ratified by a 70% majority, was 
a necessary step in building Ireland’s self confidence as a modern 
economically liberal player in the new European regional block.  The “new 
Europe” being constructed around monetary integration presented Ireland 
with a chance to be part of the building block of Europe.  Ireland’s desire to 
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modernize and progress beyond the post-colonial backwater of Europe was 
enhanced by identifying with the developed economies of Europe.  Therefore 
the promise of being a part of the greater economic powerhouse of Europe 
outweighed any purely statist sovereign hold on monetary policy.  This is not 
to suggest that Ireland did not engage in bargaining as the intergovernmental 
accounts claim, rather bargaining was not central to its decision to join the 
EMU to begin with.  Ireland had successfully bandwagoned together with 
other members of the “cohesion camp” (Spain, Greece and Portugal) to 
demand significant fiscal transfers in return for economic and monetary 
integration.145  But it is likely that their decision would not have been any 
different if fiscal transfers were not forthcoming.  This is because the 
economic impact of FDI was expected to be orders of magnitude greater than 
any of the structural funds it received from Europe.  As time proved, Ireland 
became one of the largest recipients of FDI investment the world.  By 2001 
over €163 Billion of FDI had been invested in Ireland, and in 2002 alone it 
received an additional €25Bn placing it in the top 10 countries in the world.146  
By comparison, that same year Ireland only received €656Million in regional 
development and cohesion fund, less than 3% of the FDI inflow.147 
Yet while Ireland associated with “new Europe” it did so in a way that 
enhanced its own sense of Irishness through the institutions in Europe.  
Ireland was not trying to replace its Irish identity with a European one rather it 
was trying to build a new national identity through the instruments of 
economic policy.  In the process, Ireland created a category to separate other 
citizens of Europe from Irish identification.  The term “non-national” is used to 
identify other members (mostly poorer Eastern Europeans) of the European 
Union who now work or reside in Ireland.  In addition, Ireland has dramatically 
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tightened its citizenship and jus soli laws to maintain exclusivity for the label 
“Irish”.  
Ireland the “Euro”phile 
Hay and Rosemond note that the process of adopting the economic 
reforms of the EMU was constructed as an issue of national pride for 
Ireland.148  The economic discipline of meeting the Euro convergence criteria 
became an integral part of Ireland’s economic identity and entry was the 
badge of honour.  In Eurobarometer149 polls, the Irish consistently score the 
highest in terms of identification with the Euro currency.  In fact the most 
striking aspect of the attitudinal survey was that 88% of the Irish “think” in 
Euros, in that they do not resort back to their former currency to calculate 
major purchases.  It is as if the Punt has become a distant memory even 
though it had only been replaced by the Euro six years prior to the survey.  By 
contrast, in the number two country, only 45% associated first with the Euro 
currency.150  Ireland also scored highest in the survey when asked if the Euro 
was a good thing for Europe. By contrast the other three “PIGS” highlighted in 
the introduction scored lowest when asked the same question.151  Ireland’s 
reaction to the recent economic crisis serves as a powerful example of how 
identity affects individual country response to European institutions.  Ireland 
has been the most responsive of the “PIGS” in bringing its economy back into 
line with European requirements and has been applauded by the financial 
community and European Commission for its quick and decisive steps to 
correct its fiscal deficit, even when the results are painful.152  By contrast the 
other three member states have met significant internal resistance to reform 
from their citizens and government elites alike.  Ireland’s strong identification 
with the Euro as its national currency has made the bitter pill of reform more 
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acceptable.  This is not to suggest that Ireland has “Europeanized”, in fact in 
other benchmarks Ireland remains quite distant from Europe.  When asked 
about the major institutions of Europe – the European Parliament, the 
European Commission and even the European Central Bank (ECB) - Ireland 
reflects a relatively low trust of these institutions.153  For Ireland, the ECB has 
no symbolic meaning in its life, it is merely a faceless institution in Europe 
and, while Ireland loves the Euro, only 43% trust the ECB.154  The low 
identification with the political institutions of the EU and the high identification 
with the symbol of its economic institution may explain why Ireland appeared 
so positive towards Europe yet still voted no on the first Lisbon treaty 
referendum in 2008.  
The reason for Ireland’s high support for the Euro is that Ireland’s 
modern economic identity has been constructed through the instruments that 
formed the EMU.  The “Celtic Tiger” wasn’t a European phenomenon, it was 
an Irish one.  It was created out of the European Union that allowed Ireland to 
leverage its links to its North American Diaspora and become the “gateway to 
Europe”.  While the Spanish and Greeks share a common currency with 
Ireland, they do not share in the economic identity created around the Celtic 
Tiger - that is exclusively Ireland’s.  The Euro marks part of Ireland’s political 
maturing in Europe, and Irish society and the Euro cannot be easily separated 
in some utilitarian sort of way.  Money is firstly a social relation and it is the 
Euro currency that has reinforced a positive European identity as noted in 
Ireland’s different attitude to the Euro and ECB.  The Euro has enhanced 
Ireland materially and in turn it has reinforced Ireland’s positive identification 
with Europe.  The Irish Government has categorised its approach to Europe 
as “conditionally integrationist”.  According to Government documents the 
European Union is “an integral part of our future.  We see ourselves, 
increasingly, as Europeans and national identity and self confidence have 
been bolstered not diminished by membership”.155 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has shown that Ireland’s 1978 and 1992 decisions to 
participate in the supranational institutions of the EMS and EMU were driven 
by economic identity politics with the vision of constructing a new national 
identity.  By introducing identity politics into the analysis, the thesis reveals the 
motivation for a small, asynchronous economy to pursue seemingly “irrational” 
economic choices.  In 1978, the nationalist goal of complete Irish 
independence could only be accomplished through an economic policy that 
separated Ireland from Britain once and for all.  The Intergovernmentalist view 
that Ireland joined the EMS because it had no choice is inaccurate, as Ireland 
was neither pressured nor left choiceless in the decision.  The 1992 decision 
was constructed around a nationalist vision for a modern nation, shedding 
Ireland’s identity as the “blacks” of Europe.  In turn, Europe represented a 
symbol of re-birth and its economic and monetary institutions became 
powerful symbols to hitch Ireland’s economic vision to.   
By bringing economic identity politics into the framework, our 
understanding of small state engagement in supranational institutions is 
significantly improved.  While Intergovernmentalism may provide a “big-bang” 
theory on the EMU formation, it provides little insight into how the institution is 
perceived by small states.  Limiting the unit of analysis to deterministic 
variables can lead to an incomplete or wrong conclusion on why states 
participate in supranational institutions.  The preoccupation with monetary 
sovereignty as the central issue defining the economic bargaining process 
within Europe has resulted in a very narrow conclusion on the motivation for 
small state participation in its institutional arrangements.  The rational 
argument posits that without monetary sovereignty then a state has little 
choice in international regimes.  This has meant that small states are, at best, 
lumped together into survival mode or, at worst, ignored completely as a unit 
of analysis.  But as the Irish case study elucidates, this limited analysis can 
lead to the wrong interpretation and conclusion.  Even if small states have no 
monetary sovereignty to speak of they still has some power over their 
economic choices, and states are willing to make “irrational” decisions if it 
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furthers their ideational goals.  However only by expanding the field of IPE to 
include economic identity politics can we start to uncover and interpret small 
state motivations in a more use way. 
A shared national vision can be a powerful influencer in shaping the 
economic policy a state pursues by leveraging supranational entities to 
provide legitimacy for the preferred economic policy.  In this context, rather 
than being viewed as surrendering power to the supranational institution, the 
institution is in fact empowering the nation to accomplish its vision.  Economic 
identity politics provides an alternative view on where power lies and in the 
case of the EMU, it is this author’s view that small states have the power to 
weaken or undo the monetary union just as much as large states. So, unlike 
the view projected by Hans Tietmeyer that monetary union is a “monetary 
community of destiny”,156 EMU integrity can be rendered more fragile through 
negative identification.  This has become painfully obvious as the current 
“PIGS” crisis has caused significant devaluation in the Euro and shaken its 
viability as a global currency. 157  By including identity politics we get a better 
understanding of the sustainability or survivability of these institutions.   
Different national constructions of how EMU shapes its economy can 
lead to vastly different levels of support for the institution.  The analysis has 
shown that the Euro - the physical symbol of monetary union - can be a force 
for enhancing national identity, and it explains Ireland’s hybrid personality of 
being both highly nationalistic and highly supportive of Europe.  Support is 
reinforced by the degree that the institution has become embedded in the 
national identity. Therefore it explains how Greece considers the Euro bad for 
its country while Ireland believes it is a good thing.  The corollary is that 
Ireland has a high identification with maintaining the integrity of the Euro while 
Greece is less inclined to do so.   
Abdelal et al. note that “Scholars of IPE have arrived at a comfortable 
certainty about how the world works” based on rational choice and materialist 
theories.158  However this thesis is a challenge to the field of IR on what 
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should be considered valid knowledge in the study of the international political 
economy.  As the European Union expands eastwards, it is increasingly 
moving to a system of smaller states and the classic rationalist focus on large 
state power politics becomes less valid or informative.  The predominant IPE 
literature on European Monetary Union has no acknowledgement of economic 
identity since it follows a narrow line of enquiry that cannot accommodate 
indeterminate variables such as nationalism or culture.   As such rationalism 
has reduced the social to purely strategic interaction, and in turn reduced 
economic policy to some utility maximizing game.  This phenomenon is 
widespread in the study of IPE as the emphasis on the rationality of economic 
logic cannot be easily reconciled with identity.   
Ireland is an important case study because it was an economically 
immature state when it joined the European Union in 1973 and it had far more 
in common with new states like Slovenia, and candidate states like Croatia, 
than it had with Spain or Belgium.  Therefore it provides insight into how we 
can expect these countries to approach Europe’s monetary institutions.  As 
has been demonstrated with Ireland, for states who traditionally considered 
themselves ‘outside” Europe, the Euro can act as powerful physical symbol of 
inclusion, and in turn this reinforces the integrity of the institution. The 
European Union is now mostly comprised of small countries159, and their 
positive participation in the EMU is vital in maintaining the integrity of the 
institution.  Given that participation in the Euro is now mandatory, the field of 
IPE needs to cultivate a better understanding of how states construct the Euro 
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